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The Status of Free Will: A Philosophical and
Empirical Analysis
Gordon Kerns
While the problem of Free Will has been
deliberated for many years, it continues to be a relevant
subject of discussion, for as Flanagan says, “The belief
in free will is a central component of the dominant
humanistic image in the West”12 (Flanagan, 111). Free
Will13 is a very important, though mysterious, concept
in the West, and so a problem with Free Will is a very
important problem. This paper will explore why the
supposed existence of this faculty is threatened, and
whether or not the problematic aspects of Free Will can
be identified and resolved. Unfortunately, large-scale
speculation about the ramifications of my conclusions
goes beyond the scope of this paper. The consequences
of my findings should not sway any of my arguments
for or against Free Will per se, as they are another
problem altogether, and therefore will only be
mentioned briefly.
Any investigation into the existence of Free
Will must first define that which it is investigating. The
difficulty in defining Free Will, though, is what makes
understanding it so problematic. Due to the subjective
nature of Free Will (in that, because my actions seem
free to me I assume I have Free Will) the concept is
vague at best, so any derivations made from this
concept only blur the issue further. For example, eating
12

Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul (New York: Basic
Books, 2002) 110-152
13
In this paper I capitalize ‘free will’ when it is meant to refer to
the concept “ordinary people of common sense” hold, namely a
self-caused mode of mental processing—self-caused in the sense
that there exist no antecedent conditions for its existence, save for
the pure exercise of the will

120

a slice of pie that may or may not contain apples does
not make it any easier to locate an apple in a grocery
store. Without a clear definition you cannot even know
what you are looking for. In order to clarify the matter
to allow a sufficient understanding of Free Will’s
current status, I will look at the various problems
surrounding Free Will and some of the proposed
solutions.
Neither
science—more
specifically
neuroscience—nor philosophy is sufficient on its own
to paint a complete (or even satisfactory) picture of
Free will, so with a combined analysis through both
disciplines it will be shown that the classical conception
of Free Will is irreparably flawed and our perceived
capacity for free choice in general is an illusion.
The problem with Free Will as I have defined
it—the self-caused mode of mental processing—is that
it appears logically inconsistent with the theory of
causality; if everything that exists is an effect of
sufficient causes, there can be no self-caused actions. In
an attempt to bypass this logical inconsistency,
Libertarians claim that, “for any choice to be free, it
must be absolutely uncaused”14 (Churchland, 203). But
as Hume points out, “free choices and decisions are in
fact caused by other events in the mind: desires, beliefs,
preferences, feelings, and so forth” (Churchland, 203;
from Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature). A choice
with no antecedent determining desires, intentions or
beliefs is actually considered out of that person’s
control and not something they are held responsible for.
Having never acquired much of a taste for coffee, if the
desire to walk to the nearest coffee shop and order a
double espresso suddenly popped into my head
“without antecedent connection to my other desires
14

Patricia Churchland, Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002) 203-236
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or…general character” I would feel like someone was
controlling my brain. Not only is responsible choice
logically inconsistent with Libertarianism, but also by
having to account for an uncaused entity that possesses
intention, Libertarianism only confuses Free Will more.
Since the Libertarian version of Free Will is
incompatible with causality, it seems one of the two
must be wrong. To help this matter, Flanagan says,
“The regulative idea that this world…is fully natural,
obedient at every juncture to whatever laws nature
abides, has proved again and again to be progressive, to
yield knowledge. The regulative ideal that holds out for
the sort of causation required of free will has led
nowhere” (Flanagan, 152). As we understand it now,
the theory of causality is fundamental to the operations
of the entire universe; Free Will only to humans. If one
is wrong, it seems more likely to be the latter. For this
reason I will focus on the issue of Free Will.
Since Libertarianism fell short of providing a
satisfactory account of Free Will, other solutions must
be considered. The most straightforward solution might
be to eliminate the idea of free will altogether. Would it
be so bad if we only thought of ourselves as automata,
reacting only to our environment like we suppose many
non-human animals do? Why do we believe to possess
a freedom of the will in the first place? For the latter, a
simple answer may be that we have been conditioned to
believe it. Every day instances occur where we seem to
make a choice. When deliberating a course of action
given two or more equal possibilities, the deciding
factor seems to be nothing else than an exercise of the
will (more on this topic will be discussed later).
Furthermore, our whole lives we are held responsible
for our actions, thus conditioning us to think of them as
our actions (the significance for this will also be
discussed later).
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To answer the first question, yes, getting rid of
free will completely would be bad. Perhaps the most
substantial group of people to be affected would be
participants of any religious faith that places
consequences on various actions. For example, in the
Judeo-Christian tradition a person’s actions (willed
thought, behavior, etc.) determine their position in the
afterlife. It does not make sense for us to be punished or
rewarded for actions during life if we have no control
over them. So if all of our choices are just links in the
causal chain, they cannot be free. On the other hand, as
mentioned earlier, supposing our choices are
completely uncaused actually makes the picture worse.
Also, in order to be responsible for our actions the
religious view must be similar to Libertarianism in that
free choices must be uncaused; they must be our
choices. For a choice to be actualized—to have an
effect in the world in the desired manner—a causal
relationship must be present. Therefore Free Will
necessitates causality. But the choice itself must be
completely uncaused, leading to the view of the agent
as a prime mover, itself unmoved. Such a capacity is
generally reserved for God, and I doubt many
theologians want to extend it to humans.
A second reason for our actions to be our
actions is that it seems “necessary to an agent’s learning,
both emotionally and cognitively, how to evaluate the
consequences of certain events and the price of taking
risks” (Churchland, 236). Similarly, “It would
undermine, possibly destroy, the meaning and
significance of my life if I am not an agent, if who and
what I am is in no way the result of choices I make”
(Flanagan, 143). This is also the driving force behind
the judicial and ethical systems in Western culture, and
hence the removal of some way to ascribe responsibility
would cause a big problem.
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Given these responses it seems necessary that
free will, in some form, exist. Therefore, “…to explain
how the notion…of responsibility can make sense in the
context of causation” (207), Churchland presents
several traditional attempts at harmonizing caused and
free choice (this distinction will be illuminated more
completely later, but for now it suffices as is). First is
the thought that “voluntary causes are internal, they
involve the agent’s intentions, and the agent must be
aware of his intention.” Churchland rejects this
hypothesis by considering how a patient with
obsessive-compulsive disorder may want and intend to
wash his hands (for example), be aware of this desire
and intention, know they are his, and yet the patient’s
actions are considered out of his control. A second
conception is that a choice is free if the agent could
have done otherwise. Churchland dismantles this
hypothesis as well by considering, “What exactly does
‘could have done otherwise’ mean?” Churchland
reasons, “If all behavior has antecedent causes, then
‘could have done otherwise’ seems to boil down to
‘would have done otherwise if antecedent conditions
had been different.” Considering this interpretation
reveals the unconstructive nature of the hypothesis. It is
like saying “I would have done otherwise if I had done
otherwise”; the antecedent conditions lead to a certain
position, and a different position can be obtained only if
the antecedent conditions lead to it (Churchland, 208210).
Free Will is incompatible with causation, yet
some form of free choice is still necessary for
responsibility. In the previous paragraph, attempts to
harmonize responsibility and causation were
unsuccessful. The solution then is to eliminate Free
Will as a self-caused mental faculty and investigate
other possibilities. Continuing with the apple metaphor
presented earlier, not only do you not know what apples
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are, you cannot even be sure you ate some, nor whether
they exist at the store.
This investigation will begin by coming to
understand how the previous definition of free will led
to inconsistencies, beyond consideration of causation.
Flanagan presents the problem as mistakenly merging
the “incoherent picture of free will to the ordinary
conception of voluntary action” (Flanagan, 111). He
believes it is necessary to separate the two concepts,
and by differentiating between voluntary and
involuntary action there will arise a new notion of free
agency that does not involve “a self-initiating ego” that
will still allow people the idea that they are free.
To this end it is not necessary to employ a
distinction between voluntary and involuntary action
that distinguishes “between acts initiated by a
completely self-initiating will and those that are fully
explicable in causal terms” (Flanagan, 112). According
to Flanagan both voluntary and involuntary acts are
caused, “it is not that one sort of act is caused and the
other uncaused, or that one sort of act is caused by an
agent who chooses in accordance with her ‘free will’”
(Flanagan, 110). Instead, Flanagan says that the
difference between the two types of acts is the way in
which they are caused. The distinction comes when
voluntary acts are thought to involve “the agent
knowing what action she is performing and acting from
reasons and desired that are her own” (Flanagan, 113).
Basically, an act is voluntary if the agent is conscious
of it as well as the internal antecedent conditions
(desires, beliefs, reasons, etc.) that contribute to the act.
To illustrate this point Flanagan uses the
example of how the pupil contracts in response to light
(though any entity not governed by will works equally
well). It is not possible to “will that my pupils not
contract to light” for that capacity is not governed by
125

the will. While direct manipulation of the pupil is not
possible, it is possible to intervene by manipulating a
different system that in turn can act on the pupil. “…if I
don’t want my pupils to contract there is something I
can do, namely close my eyes. If I know what is
happening and can find a system or subsystem that is
cognitively penetrable, in this case the motor system, I
can intervene to get the result I want” (Flanagan, 113).
Similarly, it is not possible to will your heart to beat
faster, but by consciously accelerating your breathing
rate or doing some jumping jacks you can achieve the
desired effect.
This example shows how we are able to
override certain processes, which we would normally
have no control of, by being aware of our desires and
actions and manipulating a process we can control. The
process of manipulating the motor system is still a
result of some causal process, it is just that we can be
aware of it and so can react to it.
An important note about this interpretation of
voluntary versus involuntary acts is that since the act is
still a result of some causal process, we are no freer to
choose one act over the other. This means that from the
perspective of causality, both acts are identical; they are
equally caused. The difference then is how the acts
appear from our perspective. Well, by even using the
term perspective I have shown the difference. Actions
are voluntary if they, along with the reasons and desires
that gave rise to them, reach our consciousness. If we
are not conscious of an action or of the reasons that
gave rise to it, it is involuntary.
This leads to the conclusion that acts are never free in
terms of the Libertarian notion of Free Will. On the
down side, this means we really are just reacting to the
world around us and don’t have executive control over
our actions. To get away from all of the problems this
conclusion can cause, the plus side is that things still
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appear the same to us. Free Will either exists or it
doesn’t regardless of how humans conceive of the
world and therefore it is possible to redefine the notion
of free will so that it fits better with our causal
conception of the world and still retain the perception
of a capacity to make free choices. If it still seems the
same to us, if we still believe we can make free choices,
then there is no effect on the entities that require a form
of free will to exist (i.e., the Western ethical and
judicial systems).
The conclusion that we can act voluntarily but
Free Will is an illusion, as shown by Flanagan, was
derived philosophically. There exists a discrepancy
among definitions, and by sorting these out we come to
a viable theory. What is important is what science can
tell us about this theory. Since everything has been
included in the causal chain that is the physical world, it
is possible to test the theory empirically. There have
been multiple experiments that lend support to this
theory that we do not actually make free decisions but
instead are only aware of some thought processes and
actions and not others. I will discuss one such
experiment carried out by Benjamin Libet.
Libet’s experiment showed that a subject’s
cerebral cortex would prepare for a movement a short
time before the subject was conscious of it, seeming to
suggest that the supposedly conscious decision to move
had actually been determined unconsciously beforehand.
The experiment involved 5 subjects, each put
through at least 6 different experimental sessions
consisting of 40 self-initiated movements. The subjects
were asked to move one hand at an arbitrary moment
decided by them, and to report when they made the
decision. At the same time the electrical activity of their
brain was monitored. Subjects were able to obtain
timings related to their mental experiences by observing
127

a Wundt clock, on which there was a small light that
went around a circle every 2.56 seconds15 (NC).“The
reportable time for appearance of the subjective
experience of ‘wanting’ or intending to act” was
compared with “the recordable cerebral activity that
precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor
act”16 (Libet). This preceding cerebral activity is called
the ‘readiness potential’ and was found by Kornhuber
and Deecke in 1964 (NC) when they averaged many
EEG recordings from subjects who were about to move
a finger. They discovered that the increase in potential
could start up to 2 seconds before the movement.
Using this information, Libet found that for
experimental sessions in which the subject “reported
that all of the 40 self-initiated movements in the series
appeared ‘spontaneously’ and capriciously,” the
readiness potential preceded the reported time of
intention to act by an average of 350 ms. Trials “in
which an experience of preplanning occurred in some
of the 40 self-initiated acts,” the readiness potential
preceded the reported time by an average of 500 ms.
Comparable values were yielded when two different
modes of recall were utilized. The “subjects
distinguished awareness of wanting to move from
awareness of actually moving” and the reported times
for wanting to move were “consistently and
15

The Neuroscience of Consciousness (NC).
http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~lka/conz3a.htm (last visited
12/17/2004)
16
Benjamin Libet, et al. Time of conscious intention to act in
relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The
unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. (Oxford University
Press 1983) Brain 106, Issue 3: 623-642
http://brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/106/3/623?maxtos
how=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=libet&
andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1102889927874_1364&stored_
search=&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=1&
journalcode=brain (last visited 12/17/2004)
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substantially…in advance of” the mean times reported
for the awareness of actually moving (Libet).
Libet concludes that the “cerebral initiation of a
spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin
unconsciously, that is, before there is any…subjective
awareness that a ‘decision’ to act has already been
initiated cerebrally” (Libet). Before interpreting Libet’s
results further, it is important to acknowledge several
challenges. First, the significance of readiness
potentials could be brought into question. If it is found
that readiness potentials are not what previously
thought, the whole experiment could be rejected.
Second, and to me most importantly, there seems to be
much room for error when the time-scale of the
experiment is in the hundredths of seconds. Given that
the experiment relies on detecting and comparing brain
activity, and that there exist at least two mental
reporting processes (one to do with the occurrence of
the decision, and one to do with the state of the clock) it
is possible that any judgment of simultaneity could be
problematic—a very small difference in time could
throw off the whole experiment. Also, the small number
of test subjects may incorrectly represent the larger
population.
Fortunately, Libet’s results have been
reproduced (Keller & Heckhausen 1990), substantiating
them enough to draw conclusions. While the results
pose a problem for the “potentiality for conscious
initiation and control of voluntary acts” (Libet), they
“are consistent with the idea of the cortex as a modeling
system that constructs a consistent model of events to
pass on to whatever mediates conscious experience”
(NC). This is a fancy way of saying that free will is an
illusion.
It seems that a rational reconsideration of the
notion of free will from the philosophical perspective,
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as well as studies in the empirical sciences, agree that
not only is Free Will as a self-caused mental faculty
incompatible and incoherent, but also that our capacity
for free choice is an illusion. Empirical evidence shows
the illusion to be due the extremely close proximity of
the conscious forming of an intention, the unconscious
preparation for an action, and the execution of that
action. Philosophically, Flanagan claims the illusion is
due to the fact that we “overrate the causes we are in
touch with first-personally.” He explains, “When I
deliberate and choose among the options before me, I
am in touch with the relevant processes, the processes
of deliberation and choice. I am not in touch
with…what causes me to deliberate and weight my
options as I do” (Flanagan, 114). It is this misstep that
that causes us to perceive deliberation as self-caused.
Of course it is not possible to satisfy everybody
with this new theory of free will, I doubt theologians
are willing to concede uncaused choices, but for most
people the change should not affect anything except
their mindset. The non-existence of a self-causing entity
resolves the issue of causation. The most important
thing to consider is the consequences this theory has on
responsibility. How can we have an ethical system?
How can we justify putting someone in jail? How can
people learn how to evaluate consequences of events
and the price of taking risks? The answer to all of these
is simple: changing the definition of free will does not
change its role in our society. If the theory is correct
and free choice is an illusion, then it is the case that it
has always been an illusion, we just were not aware of
it, and so it is obviously possible for all the things we
have to continue to exist. It doesn’t matter if it is an
illusion if we still believe we are in control.
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